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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROSALIND JACKSON, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
VIRGINIUS "JINX" DABNEY, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
~d 
JAMES N. BARBER, 
Defendant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 17601 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-appellant brought an action alleging that defendant-
respondent, an attorney licensed to practice in Utah, had been negligent 
in the disposition of a matter entrusted by the plaintiff-appellant to the 
care of the defendant-respondent. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Prior to trial, defendant-respondent Dabney moved for Su11111ary 
Judgment against the plaintiff-appellant, which was granted below. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-appellant respectfully requests that the decision 
of the 1 ower court be reversed and the p 1aintiff-appe11 ant be permitted 
to present evidence to prove her claim at a trial upon the merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-appellant Jackson was a client of defendant-respono: 
Dabney, an attorney licensed to practice in Utah. (Trial Court Record 
Page 105, hereinafter "R. 105"). Plaintiff-appellant sought defendant· 
respondent Dabney's legal advise and help in preventing a foreclosu~~ 
of her home. (R. 105-106). She took to him the Notice of Sale and other 
legal documents in her possession prior to the sale. (R. 140). At 
defendant-respondent Dabney' s suggestion, she acquired $400. 00 cash to ce 
used for the settlement offer, and de 1 i vered it to defendant-respondent 
Dabney prior to the sale. (R. 140). On that same day, while she was 
present in his office, defendant-respondent Dabney spoke on the telephoni 
with someone he identified as the attorney representing the judgment 
creditor, and reported to plaintiff-appellant that he had secured ~e 
agreement of the opposing attorney to stop the foreclosure sale for pa)'ff!' 
of the $400.00. (R. 128, 129, 141). Plaintiff-appellant, having 
delivered the $400.00 to defendant-respondent Dabney and having heard t~:'. 
the matter was reso 1 ved for $400. 00, 1 eft defendant-respondent Dabney's 
office, and the matter in his care. (R. 141, 129). 
Accardi ng to defendant-respondent Dabney' s answers to plaintii: 
appellant's interrogatories, defendant-respondent Dabney did not art~0 
to deliver the $400.00 to the foreclosing attorney, did not reduce the 
-2-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
settlement agreement in writing, did not confirm the settlement by letter 
with the opposing attorney, did not check with the sheriff's office to 
determine whether or not the sale had been cancelled, and did not appear 
at the time and place of the sale to assure the sale did not take place. 
(R. 128). He took no further action to stop the foreclosure sale. (R. 128). 
A few days after the plaintiff-appellant had delivered the 
$400.00 to defendant-respondent Dabney, defendant-respondent Dabney called 
plaintiff-appellant saying that the sale had taken place, the home had been 
sold and that he had her $400.00 in his possession. He said that she 
should redeem the property within the next six (6) months. (R. 127, 141). 
He did not advise her what procedure was necessary to effect a redemption. 
Upon her demand, defendant-respondent Dabney returned the $400.00 to 
plaintiff-appellant. (R. 129). 
Plaintiff-appellant then sought advise from defendant Barber, 
also an attorney licensed to practice in Utah. Plaintiff-appellant asked 
defendant Barber to help correct the problem. Defendant Barber assured 
plaintiff-appellant that he would convince defendant-respondent Dabney to 
correct his error. During the six (6) month redemption period, plaintiff-
appellant acquired the necessary funds to redeem the residence. She 
informed defendant Barber of this fact and asked for advice on how to go 
about redeeming. Defendant Barber failed to instruct plaintiff-appellant 
properly on how to redeem, and the redemption period expired with plaintiff-
appel lant still holding the necessary funds and not having redeemed her 
residence. 
Thereafter, plaintiff-appellant was evicted from the residence 
-3-
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and brought this action against both attorneys claiming that her loss o' 
the residence was a result of the negligence of both defendant-responder, 
Dabney and defendant Barber. 
Defendant-respondent Dabney brought a motion before the Di~ 
Court seeking Summary Judgment of no cause action on the. grounds that nr 
evidence of any negligent act on the part of defendant-respondent oa~~ 
was before the court. (R. 109, 111). The Honorable M. D. Jones, Circu' 
Judge of the Fifth Circuit sitting by designation as a District Judge, 
granted defendant-respondent Dabney' s Mo ti on and entered a Summary Judgr• 
against plaintiff-appellant for no cause of action against the defendan!-
respondent Dabney. ( R. 153-154) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
GENUINE ISSUES AS TO MATERIAL FACTS EXISTED, ON THE 
RECORD, AT THE TIME OF THE GRANTING OF THE SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
At the time the court below granted Summary Judgment, there 
existed on the record several disputed issues material to the settlement 
of the controversy. 
Foremost, the plaintiff-appellant argued that the evidence 
before the trial court showed the defendant-respondent had failed ~ ~ 
any action to assure the settlement, and that that was negligent, in ur 
the defendant-respondent failed to exercise ordinary care in the perfor 
of his duties as the attorney for the plaintiff-appellant. The defendal 
respondent's position was that there was no evidence that the defendant· 
respondent was guilty of any negligence. 
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It is generally recognized that legal malpractice consists of 
the failure of an attorney to use such skill, prudence and diligence as 
lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in 
the performance of the task which they undertake, ~ee Lucas v. Ham, 
(Cal. 1961) 56 Cal2d 583, 591, 15 Cal Rptr. 821, 825, 364 P.2d 685, 689] 
and that when such failure proximately causes damages, it gives rise to 
an action in tort. Neal v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart and Gelfand, 
(Cal. 1971) 98 Cal Rptr. 837, 491 P.2d 421. 
Utah cases have stated that a lawyer has an obligation to dis-
charge his duties in loyalty and fidelity to the interest of his client, 
[Ellis v. Gilbert, (Ut., 1967) 429 P.2d 39] and also that there is an 
implied covenant in an attorney's relationship to his client that he will 
represent the client's interest with competence and diligence. See Dunn v. 
McKay, Burton, McMurray and Thurmond, (Ut., 1978) 584 P.2d 894. 
In the present case, the plaintiff-appellant claims that the 
defendant-respondent was negligent in the performance of his duties. The 
failure of the defendant-respondent to make any attempt to consumate the 
settlement on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant demonstrated a lack of 
concern for the welfare of the plaintiff-appellant and that the defendant-
respondent failed to represent the plaintiff-appellant's interest with 
competence and diligence. In view of the fact that the defendant-respondent 
was a professional man to whom the plaintiff-appellant, a layman, could 
look as having competence to handle her case, it is clear that genuine 
issues of fact are raised as to whether the defendant-respondent used due 
care in performing the duties reasonably to be expected of an attorney under 
-5-
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the circumstances. 
Another disputed factual issue before the trial court was the 
question of cause. The defendant-respondent claimed that even if it cou 
be said that he was negligent in failing to secure the compromise settle· 
ment on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, only a small portion of the 
plaintiff-appellant's injury could be attributable to him, not the total 
value of lost, the lost equity. 
On the other hand, the plaintiff-appellant stated under~~. 
that had she known prior to the time of the foreclosure sale of her~­
that the sale had not been stopped, she would have taken further steps tv 
resolve the problem in an effort to prevent the sale. (R. 148). 
In a recent case, the court states that "it on 1 y takes one 
sworn statement under oath to dispute the averments on the other side of 
the controversy and create an issue of fact". Ho 1 brook Company v. Adams, 
(Ut., 1975) 542 P.2d 191. 
POINT II 
AT THE TIME THE TRIAL COURT GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT DABNEY, HE WAS NOT ENTITLED 
TO A JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
With respect to summary judgments, the court in Singleton v. 
Alexander, (Ut., 1967) 19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d 126, stated the followin~ 
When it comes to determining negligence, contributory 
negligence and causation, courts are not in such a good 
position to make a total determination for_ her~ enters 
the prerogative of the jury to make determ1nat1on of its 
own, and that is: Did the conduct of the party meas~re up 
to that of a reasonable prudent man and if not, was it a 
proximate cause of the harm done? 
(Citation omitted, emphasis added.) 
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In the same case, the court also quoted the following from the 
earlier Utah case of Lowell v. Salt Lake City, (Ut., 1896) 13 Utah 91, 
44 p. 1050: 
Before the question of negligence becomes one of law, 
for the court, the facts shown by the evidence must be 
such that all reasonable men must draw the same conclusion 
from them. If the facts proven are such that reasonable 
men may fairly differ as to whether or not there was 
negligence, the question is one for the jury to consider. 
As discussed in Point I above, at the time the trial court 
granted the Summary Judgment, the issue of negligence was very much in 
dispute. In this case it is a question of fact whether or not the 
defendant-respondent acted as a lawyer of ordinary skill and capacity 
would act. Therefore, because this is a fact about which reasonable men 
may differ, the defendant-respondent was not entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law at the time of the granting of Summary Judgment. See, 
57 Am. Jur. 2d. Negligenae §9. 
POINT III 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that 
Summary Judgment shall be rendered if the supporting documents "show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law". See Durfey v. Bd. of 
Ed. of Wayne City., Etc., (Ut., 1979) 604 P.2d 480. 
Moreover, the Utah cases hold that on Summary Judgment the 
adverse party is entitled to have the court view the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences fairly to be drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the adverse party. Bihlmaier v. Carson, (Ut., 1979) 603 
-7-
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P.2d 790; Pioneer Savings and Loan Association v. Pioneer Finance and 
Thrift Company, (Ut., 1966) 18 Utah 2d 106, 417 P.2d 121 at 123; ~ 
Ford Motor Company, (Ut., 1964) 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 62. 
In a recent case before this court, the court stated "in rev': 
ing the record on any appeal from Summary Judgment, we treat the statemew 
and evi dentury materials of the appellant as if the jury would receive er' 
as the only creditable evidence, and we sustain the judgment only if no 
issues of fact which could affect the outcome can be discerned". Blodget· 
Martsch, (Ut., 1978) 590 P.2d 298 at 300. 
In the present case the plaintiff-appellant alleges that the 
failure of the defendant-respondent to perform his duties in a diligent 
manner constitutes negligence. As discussed in Point I, above, the 
plaintiff-appellant's averment clearly constitutes a genuine claim and i1 
in conflict with defendant-respondent's claim of no negligence. 
The trial court should not have granted Summary Judgment for ti: 
defendant-respondent because there existed on the record a dispute coo~~ 
whether or not the defendant-respondent was in fact negligent. 
Furthermore, courts have been reluctant to grant Summary 
Judgment on questions of negligence. See Prestone v. Lamb, (Ut., 1968) 1t 
Utah 2d 260, 436 P.2d 1021 at 1022; Corbridge v. M. Morrison and Son,~· 
(Ut., 1967)19 Utah 2d 407, 432 P.2d 41. The court in Singleton v. 
Alexander, supra, quotes as authority the following language found in 
38 Am. Jur. Negligence §345: 
The right of a party in a negligence action to have 
the jury pass upon the question of liability becomes 
-8-
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absolute ... when the proof discloses such a state of 
fact~, whether.c?n~roverted or.n~t, that, in essaying 
to fix responsibility for the inJury or damage, different 
minds may arrive reasonably at different conclusions or 
may disagree reasonably as to the inferences to be drawn 
from the facts. Thus, ... where negligence may 
reasonably and legitimately be inferred from the evidence 
it is for the jury to say whether negligence shall be so ' 
inferred .... The inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence must be certain and incontrovertible to be 
decided by the court; otherwise, they must be determined 
by the jury .... 
The question of the defendant's liability lawfully 
can be withdrawn from a jury and determined by the court 
as a question of law when, and only when, the facts are 
indisputable, being stipulated, found by the court or jury, 
established by evidence that is free from conflict, and 
raises an inference which is so certain that all reason-
able men, in the exercise of a fair and impartial judgment, 
must agree upon it and grant the same conclusion. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Whether or not the defendant-respondent failed to perform his 
duty in a lawyerlike manner is certainly an issue of dispute in the present 
case. The plaintiff-appellant alleges that the defendant-respondent had 
informed her that the foreclosure sale would be stopped if the plaintiff-
appellant could provide $400.00. The plaintiff-appellant in reliance upon 
the defendant-respondent's advise provided the defendant-respondent the 
money before the scheduled date of sale. The defendant-respondent, as her 
attorney, violated the trust placed in him by the plaintiff-appellant in 
that he failed to do anything whatsoever after receiving the money, to 
prevent the sale. 
Defendant-respondent's advise to plaintiff-appellant to redeem 
her home after the sheriff's sale does not erase the previous negligence 
on the part of the defendant-respondent. Furthermore, the fact that the 
defendant-respondent failed to explain to the plaintiff-appellant any of 
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the basic steps necessary for redemption is further evidence of the 
defendant-respondent's complete disregard for the welfare of the plaintiff. 
appellant and his negligence in handling the matter entrusted to him by tne 
plaintiff-appellant. 
In conclusion, the plaintiff-appellant would like to call the 
court's attention to a statement made by this court in Tangren v. Ingalls, 
(Ut., 1961) 12 Utah 2d 388, 367 P.2d 179 at 184: 
The sustaining of summary motions without affording 
the party an opportunity to present his evidence is a 
stringent measure which the court should be reluctant to 
grant . . . . Accardi ngly, the p ri vil ege of presenting 
evidence should be denied only, when taking the view most 
favorable to the party's claims he cannot in any event 
establish a right to redress under the law; and unless it 
clearly so appears doubts should be resolved in favor of 
permitting him to go to trial. 
SUMMARY 
Plaintiff-appellant urges the court to vacate the Summary 
Judgment of no cause of action granted by the trial court against the 
plaintiff-appellant, and to remand this matter for a trial on the merits ai 
to the defendant-respondent's negligence and liability. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILKINS & WILKINS 
' . ./- I I -ih~J/-)i0 ~ 
Mi cltae 1 J. Wi 1 kins ../ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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